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The objective of this thesis is to determine the form of inputs to a reconnaissance
information collection module and to state attributes of a perception database
generated by the resulting information-seeking activities. This will include descriptive
characteristics of collection platforms involved and the subsequent intelligence
information How. Results of this thesis are intended to contribute to the ongoing
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GOAL OF THE THESIS
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has maintained a continuing interest in
the field of combat modelling and simulations. As part of a research effort initiated at
NPS. the AirLand Research Model (ALARM) concept was developed to explore issues
concerning the representation of the combat decision process. This particular portion
of the model development is concerned with identifying decision logic involved in
simulating the direction and application of tactical air reconnaissance (TAR)
operations for the purpose of seeing or perceiving the battlefield.
It is generally acknowledged that commanders at all levels base their plans and
objectives on their perceptions about their own forces, the environment, and enemy
forces. Decisions on how to best allocate resources are then made to attain the
prioritized objectives set forth in the plans. Preparation of these combat plans is
dependent on the acquisition of information on the condition of the battlefield. In the
simulation model this can be viewed as a search for information that is initiated by
some type of request. To illustrate, before a brigade can conduct operations to deploy
to a predetermined position. (x
t
,yA on the battlefield at time, t, and prepare to defend
that area, plans for the deployment of the brigade must be prepared. The requested
intelligence information on the sector of the battlefield containing position (x
t
,yj, if
timely and accurate, provides the requisite input to prepare plans for the effective
direction, control, and employment of the brigade's forces. Thus the intelligence
provides necessary information that serves as a foundation to counter enemy decisions
and plans. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that plans and combat decisions
based on timely information concerning the terrain, weather, enemy location, force
composition, and activity at some point in time before time. t. increase the probability
of a successful mission. Decisions based on information that is acquired too much
sooner or later than time, t. will probably not reflect the current state of the battlefield
and consequently not contribute to effective combat decision making at time t.
The information upon which perceptions on the state of the battlefield are
created and plans formulated in ALARM will be referred to as reconnaissance
information. It is this body of perceived knowledge that, if timely, is indicative of a
fundamental combat strategy advocated by renowned military tactician Sun Tzu.
"Know the enemv and know vourself; in a hundred battles vou will never be in
peril.'' [Ref. 1: p.'84]
Knowledge is the primary contributor to effective combat decisions. Stated
otherwise, success within ALARM is a function of how well reconnaissance
information gathering operations are utilized to update the perceived database. In the
ideal situation information contained in the perceived database is timely and accurate.
However, in capturing the combat process in the model, this may not be the case.
Data about enemy forces may not be available and if available, it may be unreliable or
outdated. In order to determine attributes of reconnaissance operations required by
planning functions contained within ALARM, the following questions should be posed:
1. What is an adequate methodologv for predicting enemv intent in order to
vector reconnaissance missions over those areas reflecting enemv staging
operations?
2. How often should this body of perceived knowledge be updated?
3. What form should the request for reconnaissance information take?
4. How quicklv must the information be collected, processed, and fed into the
perceived database in order to complete combat plans?
As the perception generation process progresses, data on the current situation is
requested, collected, analyzed, and presented to the appropriate command level
decision task. These information gathering functions are essentially the basic tactical
air information activities of requirements generation, prioritization, and gathering
processes that determine perceptions. These perceptions ultimately influence a
particular command level decision task's decision on the proportion of air and ground
based fire power to be applied toward ground events and the corresponding match of
each type to individual targets.
The objective of this thesis, shown in figure 1.1. is to state the form of inputs to
a reconnaissance information collection module and attributes of a perception database
generated by the resulting information-seeking activities. This approach will include
describing characteristics of airborne collection platforms involved and the subsequent
tactical intelligence information flow. Emphasis will not be placed on describing the
physical laws and the algorithmic flow involved in modelling mission flight paths.
rather in describing inputs to the ALARM planning process and attributes required by





















Figure 1.1 Areas of Emphasis.
B. SCOPE OF THE THESIS WITHIN ALARM
The ALARM concept, though still at the conceptual development stage, was
developed to model combat decision processes that occur within the confines o[ large
scale tactical warfare as anticipated by the U.S. Army's airland battle doctrine. The
model's proposed highest level of interaction and combat decision making is at the
army corps level. This follows because in real world applications the corps is the
principle ground force in a theater of operations. Its structure varies based on the
operational mission, terrain, and troops assigned. The initial scenario upon which
ALARM is cast will be based on the operations of the 5 U.S. Army Corps in Central
Europe. This scenario was chosen because the NATO area has been one of the
primary airland battle areas studied extensively by numerous military analysts. These
studies will serve as a baseline to validate output and effectiveness metrics provided by
ALARM.
Based on the assumption that enemy forces are echeloned in depth and have
numerical superiority, ALARM is envisioned to be used to evaluate an offensive
interdiction strategy. This combat strategy requires that friendly forces see deep into
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the enemy rear area and strike accordingly to destroy or disrupt enemy follow on
echelons before they can be committed at the forward line of own troops (FLOT).
This places a requirement on the appropriate command level decision making functions
to ensure that adequate surveillance is maintained in order to secure information
beyond the corps area of influence. Such information that can conceivably affect
success is also depicted as a function of how well perceptions are maintained.
As stated previously, the objective of this thesis is to describe inputs to the
perception development process for combat activities occurring at the corps level of
interaction. Basically these inputs can be placed into three categories:
1. External conditions, including weather conditions (temperature, air pressure,
density and humidity, wind direction and velocity, and cloud cover): terrain
(elevation, presence 'of natural barriers, degree of natural concealment, and
characteristics constraining speed of movement); data on terrain illumination:
data on roads, bridges, and other structures that may influence the execution of
combat operations."
2. Information on the location and condition of the enemv, weapon performance
characteristics, and quantity.
3. Information on the position and condition of friendly forces, weapons, and
weapon performance characteristics.
In an actual combat situation the process of battlefield perception generation
within the corps would undoubtably be supported by the entire spectrum of intelligence
collection and analysis capabilities of the defense department and possibly other NATO
agencies. Thus, in reality the corps interfaces with echelons above corps (EAC).
national surveillance collection agencies, and more specifically USAF tactical
intelligence collection functional organizations to obtain information on enemy units
and activities in their respective areas of interest. All of these information-seeking
functional inputs are subsets of category 2. ALARM depicts battlefield decisions and
operations at the subtheater and tactical level thus, this thesis will not attempt to
describe all of the intelligence inputs to the combat decision processes, i.e.. inputs from
national collection assets. Consequently, the only form of input to perception
formulation within the model that will be addressed, given the interaction at the corps
level and below, is that derived from tactical air reconnaissance resources.
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
During the course of describing attributes for a perception database the thesis
will proceed as follows. Chapter II provides a description of the current conceptual
design of ALARM, details the planning methodology utilized within the model, and
provides the necessary connection to link this work into ALARM'S planning scheme.
Chapter III provides background on ground operations and information requirements
associated with the airland battle while a description of perception formulation within
the corps area of responsibility is provided in Chapter IV. Information gathering
entities and Hows to include attributes of collection platforms are also identified.
Chapter V illustrates the interrelationships between the planning and execution models
while describing the evolution of perceptions by walking through a sample scenario.




A. INTRODUCTION TO ALARM
The term modelling denotes the development of a quantitative representation of
some aspect of military combat, the implementation of that representation in the form
of a computer program, and the subsequent use of the program to support the analysis
of some dimension of military science. One of the most important research areas
surrounding military science is the representation of the combat decision process.
Ongoing research on ALARM is directed at exploring ways to model the combat
decision cycle. Using the U.S. Army's airland battle doctrine as the combat decision
or planning environment. ALARM is intended to provide an analysis tool for the
investigation of more optimal methods of planning for and prosecuting the airland
battle [Ref. 2: p. 11]. Doctrine for the airland battle emphasizes an integrated
battlefield that is singularly characterized by its extended nature. The battlefield is
extended with regard to the requirement placed on friendly forces to wage the close-in
battle while striking critical high value targets deep within enemy territory.
ALARM will be designed to operate in a systemic mode. This means that the
model will have a closed architecture better known as a "no man-in-the-loop" structure.
This type of architecture provides the capability to carefully track the cause and effect
relationships which are an essential feature of any model of military decision making.
The system structure is organized around two separate bodies of models, execution and
planning models. Execution models serve to simulate the battlefield conflict while
planning models use the information obtained from the execution model to plan for the
allocation and commitment of unit entities and resources over time. All plans are
based on a particular command level's mission and perceived knowledge of enemy
actions over a given time interval.
B. .MODELLING THE COMBAT DECISION CYCLE
The term "research model" applies because alternative methodologies are being
investigated to examine the combat decision process. Typically, most combat models
are cast into an action - reaction mode oi" simulated operations. They concentrate on
the battle execution and react to results generated during execution without regard to
projecting battle resource requirements and outcomes of future engagements.
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Additionally, in the past, results of planning have been represented only by a set of
input data or by human interaction with the model before and during execution
[Ref. 3: pp. 1 - 5]. Research on ALARM has been centered on developing a planning
procedure that is believed to be closer to what actually happens in the human decision
making process.
The planning procedure is a means for assessing the current perceived situation
using both a threshold strategy and decision rules. Thresholds will be used to
determine when the planning or decision making procedures should be executed while
decision rules will be used to limit alternatives. For example, a threshold can be used
to determine that a unit is falling behind in its time commitment to advance to a given
location. If the unit falls behind by more than two hours, the decision process can be
started to determine how and if the delay affects other unit plans. Thus, a threshold
starts the decision process. If the effect is significant, the ALARM planning procedure
can be reexecuted to counteract or adjust to the delay. A series of decision rules will
help eliminate some alternatives available within the decision domain. One of the
remaining alternatives is then chosen based on the maximum measure of expected
value achieved by alternative. [Ref. 3: p. 11]
From the data analyst's perspective these planning models are important for
representing what and why things happen, i.e., to produce the desired detailed audit
trails.
A high level view of the combat decision cycle is shown in Figure 2.1. To
illustrate the process, the planning model (1) accepts an initial data input and creates a
set of orders (2) that is entered into the execution model (3). Orders are a series o[
times and missions input to each command level subordinate to the corps. The
command level structure embedded within the planning model is shown in Figure 2.2.
Orders passed to each command level are composed of the following information:
1. A sequence of times, t-
2. A mission during t- to t: + j
3. Sector boundaries during t- to t- + i
4. Desired FLOT trace at time t- + j
5. Minimum friendly unit state at time t- + i, i.e., an acceptable friendly force
attrition level.
6. Maximum enemy unit state at t- + i, i.e.. a required amount of attrition to the
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Figure 2.1 The ALARM Combat Decision Cycle.
This "what to do" type of guidance is referred to as macro planning. Macro
plans are closely tied to the perceived knowledge of friendly and enemy unit strength at
time, t: i. A projection of the relative state variables and unit strengths is performed in
order to determine how to maximize combat effectiveness by allocating only the
required number of assets at a future time, t-, toward the perceived most advantageous
enemy targets. This "how to do it" information is then passed to the execution model
and the results (4) of the force-on-force engagement planned for by the planning model
are produced. If at any time during execution the original plan for the commitment of
forces reaches a point of infeasibility due to the attainment of an upper threshold of
friendly units neutralized, then planning is reinstated to hopefully formulate a plan that
will cause the evolution of a favorable battlefield situation. Next, the combat results























Figure 2.2 Command Level Structure.
perceived state of the battlefield (6) is reentered into the planning model. At this point
new or modified orders are created [Ref. 2: pp. 30 - 45]. The role of reconnaissance
operations is to keep the perceived state of the force on force engagement and
surrounding battlefield areas current so that when decisions (plans) must be
formulated, the planning model can be invoked using current information as a solid
foundation. This proposed architecture will provide indepth audit trails through the
use of three unique methodologies that make ALARM different than any other current
research to date [Ref. 3: p. 11]. These methodologies are
1. Time Domain Networks,
2. Cartesian Space Networks, and
3. The Generalized Value Svstem.
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1. Time Domain Networks
The time domain network is designed to handle the planning activities within
ALARM. The network consists of nodes and arcs typical of most networks. The
significant feature of the time domain network is that the arcs represent the passage of
time rather than distance and is used in order to develop high level mission
requirements for all subordinate units. Functionally, it resembles a program evaluation
and review technique (PERT) network in that all sub-activities that flow out of a
starting node can not begin until all sub-activities that lead into the starting node have
been completed. Two sets of parameters determine input constraints to the network:
immutable factors and changeable factors. Immutable factors include items such as
weather and enemy forces. They are essentially those elements that a commander has
no control over. Changeable factors, also referred to as decision factors, are
parameters for which a decision is needed. For example, a decision factor might be to
determine the percentage of some available resource to be commited to an activity.
[Ref. 3: pp. 12 - 16]
2. Cartesian Space Networks
In ALARM, transportation networks are used to represent terrain features
and physical connections between points in the battlefield area. These interconnected
sets of arcs and nodes contain attributes which describe the terrain, roads, and cities as
well as on and off-road traflicability. Characteristics of arcs and nodes are provided in
Table 1 while the network representation of a geographical region is shown in Figure
2.3.
3. The Generalized Value System
The key feature of the planning model is its ability to determine the perceived
power of battlefield entities. A procedure known as the Generalized Value System
(GVS) is used to accomplish this task. The GVS is a means by which the perceived
combat power of battlefield entities is measured over time, relative to when the entities
are in position to accomplish their stated missions. Two types of power are defined;
derived and inherent [Ref. 4]. The total power possessed by a given entity, measured in
units of STAPOWS (standard power), is the sum of its inherent and derived power.
Some entities may possess either derived or inherent power while others may have
both.
Derived power of an entity results from the ability of that entity to change or
maintain the inherent power of other entities. Examples of entities holding derived
power are bridges, intelligence units, and supply units [Ref. 5: p. 41].
IS
TABLE 1
NODE AND ARC CHARACTERISTICS
Node Characteristics




H: head node id number
T: tail node id number
D: arc length
RC: route class type
OC: terrain trafficability
W: route width
An entity possesses inherent power when it has the capacity to disrupt, delay,
or destroy enemy forces. In this context, inherent power can be viewed as the combat
power that entities are able to use against enemy forces. Inherent power is subdivided
into three components; basic, adjusted basic, and situational. Basic inherent power
(BIP) is the power possessed by an entity when it is positioned to engage an adversarial
entity. Adjusted basic inherent power (ABIP) is defined as the BIP of an entity that is
adjusted for each entity's mission and current state. Another factor that is used to
calculate the ABIP is the the distance from the position where the unit is to accomplish
its mission. Situational inherent power (SIP) is the inherent power an entity is
projected to possess at some time in the future based on the most current information
on the entity. The procedure to project power is based on the assumption that combat
power increases exponentially, relative to time, when not affected by attrition as the
entity draws closer to reaching a position to achieve its planned objective.
a. Measuring Power
The inherent power of an entity can be determined by relating the
components of power to the entity's known mission. Upon attaining position to
accomplish its mission, the SIP for each entity is recalculated to account for the
consumption of resources and attrition caused by an engagement with an enemy entity.
This power is also assumed to decay exponentially over time. [Refs. 4.5] provide the
mathematical derivation along with a rigorous explanation of how to calculate these
19
Figure 2.3 Network Representation of Terrain.
power values. A graphical illustration of the evolution of the situational inherent
power of an entity is provided in Figure 2.4.
20









Figure 2.4 Power of an Entity over Time.
b. Use o/GVS to Determine Mission Feasibility
The planning 1 process begins with a mission, friendly troop list, and a
specified decision period received from a higher command level. The mission states the
command level's operational objective while the friendly troop list refers to the assets
available to accomplish a mission. The decision period is the amount of simulated real
time allotted to complete the assigned mission.
Assuming a mission to engage at the FEBA (forward edge o[ the battle
area), intelligence is obtained consisting of information on the perceived disposition of
enemy forces. This information is used to determine if the assigned mission to engage
enemy forces with the current assets allocated is feasible. The feasibility check is
performed based on comparisons between known blue force power and perceived red
force power. Each force's power is computed as the sum of the powers of subordinate
entities within a specified sector that have an assigned mission in that given sector.
The summation is taken from the beginning, t to the end of a decision period, t
g ,
to
Note that this is onlv a "plan of attack". Stochastic events occurring in the
execution model alone with the actual state (ground truth) of red forces may cause the
macro plan to fail. Therefore, in the process of plan formulation, it is' clear why
accurate perceptions must be maintained on the current state of the battlefield.
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produce SIP functions for the powers of each force. Power thresholds are then
associated with corresponding differences between blue and red force power
projections. To exceed an upper threshold indicates that a force too large has been
committed while a lower threshold violation represents a difference that suggests an
undercommitment of forces. In the process, uncommitted units are time phased in
discrete time intervals, through the decision period. Corresponding SIP functions are
generated by then committing these units against their most likely adversary. This
methodology forms the basis for determining mission feasibility for the duration of a
decision period. If time stepping through the decision period without counting the
contribution of the uncommitted forces does not cause a threshold violation, then only
the originally committed FEBA forces are perceived needed to maintain a favorable
power differential in that sector. The occurrence of a point of infeasibility indicates a
flag in the simulation clock, process time that a decision must be made to commit
additional resources to maintain a favorable SIP differential. This event time is
referred to as the decision point, ti. The decision point serves as the base simulation
event time for determining when the blue forces need to have affected the power of red
forces predicted against them. This assumes that the red force plan remains constant
throughout the planning process. Next, the planning model is invoked and a new plan
is developed based on the most recent red plan of battle using intelligence received
prior to the decision time, tj [Ref. 5: pp. 44 - 46]. The decision point not only
indicates the magnitude of power in which Red power must be decreased, but also
provides the simulation time in which the blue force must allocate" those assets to
maintain plan feasibility.
Developing feasible alternatives is a process of generating several blue
asset: to red target: pairs and projecting new SIP functions for each pairing. The
alternative which demonstrates the largest ratio of red power neutralized to blue power
utilized is then selected. Red power destroyed is measured as the difference in power at
the decision point between the original red force SIP and the SIP reflected in the
pairing process. Blue power used is determined by the difference between the SIP of an
uncommitted entity at the decision point and the SIP derived after the pairing using
perceived attrition rates.
"Allocation is the process of formulating alternatives to determine which asset(s]
to use in order to restore macro plan feasibility.
C. SUMMARY
ALARM is a combat model undergoing development that utilizes three unique
methodologies to represent combat interactions and the combat decision cycle. The
three methodologies are time domain networks, cartesian space networks, and the
generalized value system. The time domain network represents the subactivities that
must be accomplished for a unit to complete a mission. Cartesian space networks
represent physical connections between points on the battlefield. The generalized value
system is a procedure for quantifying the importance of entities on the battlefield at
some future time.
In terms of maximizing the effectiveness of combat operations, significant issues
to be addressed by analysis of the results provided by ALARM are:
• The development of modelling methodoloav appropriate for the large-scale but
sparsely populated rear areas involved iff the interdiction battle and for the
command and control of the airland battle force.
• The application ot^ these methodologies in the construction of a
simulation wargammg model.
• Eventual use of the model to perform research on the conduct of the total
airland battle. [Ref. 2: p. 2]
As stated earlier, battlefield perceptions form the basis for all power projections in the
model. The need for information on battlefield deep areas to shape these perceptions is
the topic of the next chapter.
III. GROUND OPERATIONS
A. INFORMATION SEARCH WITHIN THE DEEP BATTLE
Information on the condition of the battlefield must be obtained so that power
projections can be made. Before describing the process used to obtain and formulate
battlefield perceptions, the environment in which corps operations take place must first
be examined.
The Corps is responsible for combat activity conducted in an area of perception
(see Figure 3.1). The area of perception is the area within which the corps must sense
and keep aware of the activity and movement of enemy forces. This geographical
region is subdivided into two smaller areas, influence and interest. The area of
influence is that portion of the battlefield in which the commander can directly affect
the course of the battle by using assets organic to the corps or assets controlled by
subordinate units. Enemy entities (i.e. tanks, artillery, etc.) exist within the area of
influence and are in position to affect blue force combat mission objectives within 72
hours. The area of influence is a subset of the area of interest. The area of interest is
that portion of the battlefield where friendly forces do not possess the capability to
directly influence the battle using organic assets. This area extends beyond those
regions in which enemy units or battlefield conditions are capable of affecting a blue
unit's mission in the near future. The time horizon associated with the area of interest
is approximately 96 hours. Information acquired therein allows the simulated planning
time necessary to make decisions with respect to the proper allocation of assets to the
full range of the area of influence.
Normally the corps does not possess the capability to adequately monitor enemy
activity occurring within the area of interest. It is of paramount importance that the
corps receive information on enemy operations while enemy follow-on echelon targets
are deep within enemy territory. Information concerning the area of interest is received
primarily from higher or adjacent command levels. In the model, tactical air
reconnaissance (TAR) assets will support the corps' need for information on battlefield
deep area^.
In ALARM each command level is dependent on accurate information on the
perceived state of" the enemy targets. 1 he resulting battlefield information concerning
24
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Figure 3.1 Sections of the Corps Area of Perception.
the inherent power possessed by enemy entities at time. Iq, serves as a base power
estimate. It permits the projection of the enemy's strength at some time, t-. in the
future. These estimates are essential in the development of plans to, for example,
either offset the enemy by an additional allocation of assets at the predicted time of
engagement, t
,
or possibly through the employment of forces to decrease the




B. THE DEEP STRIKE CONCEPT
Airland battle operations which employ the deep battle concept require timely
information to acquire and prioritize prosecution of enemy high value targets.
According to U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 34-1, the deep battle is focused on
directing well planned strikes against second echelon forces while conducting close-in
operations. Actions taken against second echelon forces are an attempt to delay,
disrupt, or destroy enemy forces before they can be brought to bear in the close battle.
Former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command, U.S. Army Gen. (ret)
Donn Starry states,
The need for deep attack emerges from the nature of our potential enemies --
their doctrine and their numerically superior forces. What is important is that
superiority in numbers permit him 'to keep a significant portion of his force out
of the fight with freedom to commit it either"to overwhelm or to bvpass the
friendly force. If the battle is fought with no directed interdiction then enemv
follow' on echelons have a free ride until they enter the clo^e in battle. The
enemv retains flexibility, initiative, and momentum to applv his mass at a point
and time of his choice. Deep attacks serve to denv him of this freedom.
[Ref. 6: p. 42]
Thus, interdiction operations are required at the very least to slow down follow-on
echelons thereby allowing for an aggressive defense to repel enemy frontal assault
echelons.
Without interdiction (see Figure 3.2) the enemy is able to maintain consistent
superiority at the FLOT over time [Ref. 6: p. 43 - 46]. During this period the
defender's strength dwindles and the enemy's freedom of action increases. Conversely,
properly placed interdiction allows friendly forces to hold off enemy follow on
echelons. This creates periods of friendly superiority called windows of opportunity.
When these windows appear, friendly forces obtain a greater chance of victory based
on the assumption that friendly forces have identified critical high value targets and are
prepared to act on time.
Within ALARM a command level decision task's planning horizon is a function
of the depth to which it can see beyond the FLOT. This is a direct consequence of
how well friendly information seeking or reconnaissance operations can locate enemy
targets. Such target nodes, in the model, may include fixed bridges or mobile sites
whose destruction may slow the rate of advance of enemy entities and cause follow on
echelons to bunch up thereby presenting themselves as attractive targets. Attacking











Figure 3.2 Predicted Effects with and without Interdiction.
provide friendly force entities requisite time to finish the close-in battle. To summarize,
the goal of the deep attack is to create opportunities for friendly forces to take action
on regions well forward in the battle area [Ref 6: p. 46]. This can only be
accomplished by concentrating information acquisition resources to reveal critical
targets which offer the highest potential payoff in upsetting enemy plans.
C. SUMMARY
The corps is responsible for conducting military operations using organic assets
within a geographical region known as the area of influence. However, information
must be obtained from within the areas of influence and interest to expand the corps'
planning horizon. The resulting corps planning may emphasize a "deep strike'' in order
to delay the enemy's free ride to the FLOT. Reconnaissance operations will provide
the means, in the model, to initially acquire these high value targets in the corps area
of interest. Accurate portrayal of the prioritization of targeted areas and components
of a perceived database are the main focus of discussion in the next chapter.
IV. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
A. THE RECONNAISSANCE CYCLE
The prime objective of tactical air reconnaissance activities is to provide
information necessary to maintain accurate battlefield perceptions. This chapter
depicts the process in ALARM that provides information which organic ground force
collection entities may not be able to obtain and describes attributes of airborne
reconnaissance functions. These essential elements of information obtained through
coordinated collection efforts contribute to the need to stop the simulated forward
surge of enemy forces by providing details to each command level decision task. The
information supplied is relative to a particular level's area of interest and serves to
determine:
the network locations of the placement of enemv lines of communication,
installations, and electronic emissions:
the disposition, composition, and movement of enemy forces;
post strike damage:
conditions in the surface battle areas; and
weather and terrain. [Ref. 7: pp. 2 - IS]
To successfully defeat the opposing forces, each command level must recognize
enemy intentions and make the appropriate resource allocation decisions to seize the
initiative at the earliest and most opportune times of simulated battlefield activities.
The act of seeing actual and potential battlefield events occurring on the terrain
network forms the basis for perceiving enemy intentions so that macro plans can be
developed.
1. Reconnaissance Defined
With regard to the simulation model, reconnaissance is defined as any
collection mission undertaken to obtain by visual or other detection methods,
information about the activity of the enemy. This includes one time coverage of
specific target areas (i.e. nodes) and the systematic coverage of broader areas (i.e. arcs)
over an extended period of time to note changes that take place. Reconnaissance
missions conducting surveillance operations collect information continuously from
airborne platforms while strictly reconnaissance operations are directed toward
localized target nodes. In the model, TAR missions include sensor coverage of all
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phases of enemy operations not supported by collection assets organic to the corps or
command levels subordinate to the corps decision level. Before depicting the How of
information acquired by TAR collection assets, the general flow of information within
the corps level decision task will be reviewed.
Figure 4.1 is a simplified diagram of the information How into the corps level.
























Figure 4.1 Corps Level Information Flow.
collection efforts, flows into the intelligence function. This information is screened,
formatted, and forwarded to corps level planning (7a) when the need arises. It is
assumed that organic corps collection assets provide information primarily on the
corps' area of influence while TAR collection can obtain information within the area of
interest. Information provided by TAR assets strictly within the area of influence can
he viewed as a function of nonavailability of organic corps collection assets. Turning
now to Figure 4.2 [Ref. S: p. 24]. the intelligence functional architecture analyzes the
collected information, makes the necessary source level checks at each decision level,
and identifies combat information. Combat information consists of that information
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Figure 4.2 The Intelligence Architecture.
2. The Intelligence Module
The proposed intelligence module, developed by \PS graduate Gaylon Smith
[Ref. 8], consists of two components for each command level; a combat information
processor (CIP) and an intelligence estimate processor (IEP). Information generated
from within the execution model is identified by the collector and flows upward
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through the hierarchical network to the appropriate CIP (see Figure 4.3). The CIP
updates the perceived database and directs the combat information to other task force
INTELLIGENCE MODUIE
1EE CIP
1 Aggregates targets into
organizations
2 Matches to Order of
Battle
3 Evaluates Enemy Courese
of Action
4 Prepares Enemy SIP
Curves
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Figure 4.3 The Proposed Intelligence Module.
elements as required. The purpose o[ the IEP is to prepare an intelligence estimate
which identifies enemy units, their locations with associated nodal positions, and
perceived courses of action in order to task reconnaissance assets. The IEP also
develops the SIP curves for the enemy units used by the planning model to determine
asset allocation and mission feasibility.
The motivation for describing the proposed intelligence module is to explain
why all requests for TAR will enter the system from the corps decision task level. In
reality, an air request net (ARN) links each command echelon. The ARN is used
primarily by ground commanders to request immediate support for ground forces and
is monitored by all echelons above battalion. To illustrate, assume a battalion is in
need of reconnaissance over a specific point within its area of influence. Additionally,
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the information is required before some critical time, t
c
. If collection assets organic to
the battalion are unavailable then brigade collection assets would respond to the
information" requirement. If all organic ground force collection assets were unable to
respond to the request or unavailable through the corps level then the information
requirement would be submitted from the corps level to the USAF intelligence
collection functional organizations within the Tactical Air Control System (TACS)4 for
satisfaction. Each request would then be satisfied by reconnaissance operations
generated within the TACS depending on the availability of collection assets, the
priority, and timing requirements set forth in the request. Thus, using this abstraction
from reality, all requests for TAR in the model will How from the corps level. The
basic How of a TAR request is shown in Figure 4.4.
An expanded view of the entire TAR request cycle is shown in Figure 4.5.
The procedure is initiated by corps planning (S) due to the necessity to acquire
information on deep zones. The planning procedure described in chapter 2 is then
carried out in (9) to generate a macro plan. If planning is complete (i.e. the mission is
determined feasible) then orders are passed to subordinate units or entered into the
execution model. If planning is not complete then information must be obtained from
the perceived database (14) to consummate the plans. Example items of real world
information primitives required in the perception database are;
a. Which enemv airfields (nodes) are perceived most capable of performing strikes
against friendly forces?
b. What terrain locations (nodes or arcs) are the most threatening elements
massing?
c. Which and where are prime and secondarv target nodes to inhibit enemv
movement?
d. What is the disposition of enemy second echelon forces?
These information requirements are levied on the intelligence function (10)
and must be satisfied before each battle execution begins. Assuming the information
contained in the perception database does not satisfy the information requirements (11)
or does not meet timing constraints due to the projected timing of the mission, then
information gathering activities are initiated (12). First the availability of organic
assets is assessed to determine if thev can meet timing constraints or if" thev are
"Upper command levels intelligence functions support the information
requirements of subordinate levels.
The Tactical Air Control System is the C - svstem developed to support the air









Figure 4.4 The Fundamental TAR Request Flow.
functionally capable of performing the requested collection task. If these organic corps
assets are unable to respond to the information request then TAR assets are tasked
(13).
3. Intelligence Predicting
The IEP [Ref. 8: pp. 25 - 26] operates on the perceived database at the corps
level to prepare an intelligence estimate, identify enemy unit entities, and predict their
courses of action. These estimates are based on the currency of the perceived
database. Due to the dynamic battlefield situation produced by results from the
execution model, SIP curves developed within the IEP may not accurately reflect the
current power of enemy units. Thus, reconnaissance information is recognized to be
highly perishable. Once the time of collection for a given sector of the battle area has




















Figure 4.5 The Expanded TAR Request Flow.
reconnaissance operations are initiated in order to maintain a required level of
perception accuracy.
Estimation, performed by the IEP, of the area to be reconnoitered may be
determined by predicting enemy avenues of approach coupled with the evaluation of
stochastic meteorological conditions along mobility corridors [Ref. 5]. A procedure
developed by another NPS graduate, Doug Fletcher, utilizes the terrain network to
determine enemy expected avenues of approach. Fletcher defines avenues of approach
as routes and zones of action as corridors along which enemy forces are expected to
transit. The zones are determined by the size of a particular unit attempting to pass.
The procedure is conducted by taking a network (see Figure 4.6) and determining
feasible routes. Feasibility refers to the flow capacity of each arc which can support
doctrinal rates of advance for maneuver elements. Using a battalion rate of advance
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Figure 4.6 Simple Network.
for illustrative purposes, the resulting connected network, shown in Figure 4.7. is
formed.
Arcs on the transportation network are used in the battalion planning process.
Zones consist of those arcs that can accommodate the sized units that the battalion is
concerned about, i.e. its own companies and enemy regiments. These arcs are
aggregated yet do not represent a single physical road from point A to B, but in fact
may be a series of roads or open valleys that comprise a regimental avenue of
approach [Ref. 3: p. 20]. Nodes on the network are then grouped in the zones in order
to aggregate flow rates. Next, horizontal corridors are formed. It is within these
mobility corridors that areas requiring TAR activity are emphasized (see Figure 4.S).
The information obtained from within these areas may serve to confirm or deny an
enemy course of action.
Assuming that corps level organic collectors are unavailable, then a request is
submitted to the TAR model to obtain information from within the mobility corridors.
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Ficure 4.7 Connected Network.
o ,-y^*^
Ficure 4.S Mobility Corridors.
A visual representation of this search for information on enemy entities residing on the
terrain network is provided in Figure 4.9. An excerpt from Hartman [Ref. 9: pp. 5.1 -
5. IS], follows to further illustrate the target search process that occurs within the
mobility corridors.
Figure 4.9 Visual Representation.
4. The Search Process
The objective of this section is to provide the reader insight on the search
process that will occur within the execution model. This process will determine if any
entities are to be detected when collection platforms attempt to provide the simulated
reconnaissance function within mobility corridors.
Many factors may interact or function independently to influence target
detection in a simulation model. Some examples of these factors are target type, target
movement, observed background complexity, atmospheric visibility, sensor device.
platform movement, and current ambient light [Ref. 9: p. 4.4]. The various search
models, which accompany detection distributions, described are based on the following
assumptions:
The sensor device is carried on an airborne collection platform which can move
at a constant speed along any path of connected nodes in the search area.
The sensor has a maximum range, Rm^y which is a field of view (footprint)
smaller than the search area.
Assuming that a single target is present somewhere in the search area, the
symbol A will denote "both the search area and its size or geometric area.
Assume that the target is stationary. It will not react to the presence of the
collection platform in an attempt to avoid detection.
Assume that the target location is random on the terrain network. There is
nothing significantly" different about the characteristics of the surrounding
terrain"that provides additional information to the platform concerning where
to look.
To begin the search process, the path along which the platform traverses must
be described. As the platform moves through the search area, it may, at some time. t.
be within R,^ nv. of the target. Rm, v is defined as the maximum detection range ofmax - max
which a given sensor-platform combination has a chance of achieving a detection.
a. Relative Motion Coordinates
Suppose that a coordinate system is defined with the Y coordinate axis
parallel to the platform's path and the X axis normal to the path. The platform is
viewed as being stationary in this relative coordinate system, located at position (0.0).
The resulting footprint provided by the sensor is restricted to a circle oi" radius. Rmav
centered on the position of the platform. The target is pictured to move past the
platform in the direction of decreasing Y with X constant. This holds for all straight
line search paths.
The lateral range. L . is defined as the closest approach distance between
the platform and the target. In relative motion coordinates, lateral range is the
distance from the target path to the observer at (0,0) which is simply the constant X
coordinate of the target (see Figure 4.10).
b. Searching with a Range Law Device
Suppose the sensor, situated on the collection platform, provides perfect
coverage within a field oi' view. The field oi' view is modelled as a circle with radius.
38









TARGET RELATIVE MOTION PATH
RELATIVE COORDINATES
COORDINATE SYSTEM CENTERED ON PLATFORM
TARGET MOVES RELATIVE TO THE PLATFORM
Figure 4.10 Relative Motion Coordinates.
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R v projected onto the terrain network and centered on the platform. As the search
unfolds along the various arcs, a target will be detected if the target is ever covered by
the circular footprint. Such a sensor is defined as a definite range law device or a
cookie-cutter sensor. In relative motion coordinates, the target will be detected if the
lateral range is less than the maximum sensor range.
The effectiveness of a sensor is described by a lateral range curve.
PBAR(x), which yields the probability of detection as a function of the lateral range
(see Figure 4.11). For the definite range law device,
PBAR(x) = 1.0 if x < Rmav x = otherwise (eqn 4.1)
As the platform moves through the search area, the sensor coverage pattern sweeps out
a covered area of width,
W = 2 X R
max-
(eqn 4.2)
If the platform moves along an arc through the search area at a constant speed. V, for
a total search time, T. the total path length covered would be
L = V x T. (eqn 4.3)
Assume the search pattern is arranged such that the total search path is traveled
without any overlap" of the coverage pattern. Ignoring the edge and corner effects, the
total area covered by the search is.
L x YY = V x T x W. (eqn 4.4)
A randomly located target will be detected if and only if it is inside this covered area.
It follows that the probability of detection is simply a fraction of the total area covered
by the search,
PDET(T) = Pr( detection in time, T)
= L x W A
"Overlapping coverage does not improve the probability of detecting a target
because the sensor is perfect inside its field of view.
= T * V x W A
PDFT(T) = S * T (eqn 4.5)
S is defined as the search rate (S = V * W A). This is valid for path lengths up to
L„.1V = A W, when the ent1X1dA
occurs when the search time is.
ire search area has been covered. Maximum coverage
Tmax " A <V * W) = 1 S (eqn 4.6)
and PDCT(T„.„ V ) = 1.0. For T < T^.,.., the marginal return from each incrementalIIIlIA 1 1 1 U. A
unit of search time is S = V x YV A. which is the slope of the detection probability










Figure 4.11 Lateral Range Curve for a Cookie-Cutter Sensor.
c. Searching with an Arbitrary Device
The final search example to be described is carried out with an arbitrary
sensor device. The sensor has an associated effectiveness pattern which is within its
Rmav The lateral range curve for such a sensor is defined as PBAR(x), which is the
probability of detection if the sensor moves at a constant speed, V, along the search

















(AS TARGET MOVES THROUGH SENSOR PATTERN)
Figure 4.13 PBAR for an Arbitrary Sensor.
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Two factors interact to determine PBAR(x):
1. The exposure time as the target moves, relative to the platform, along its path
through the sensor effectiveness pattern.
2. The sensor detection rate at each point along the path.
PBAR(x) is obtained by integrating over all detection opportunities while the target is
in the sensor's field of view. Typical PBAR(x) curves are shown in Figure 4.14.
The sensor sweep width is defined to be W, the area under the lateral range
curve.
W = J ^Rmax- Rmax> PBAR(x)dx (eqn 4.7)
In order to search without overlap, suppose that the target is randomly located in
search area A along a path of length. L = V x T. Using a sensor with a lateral range
curve PBAR(x). an area. 2 x Rmax x \ will be covered by the sensor. The resulting
probability of the target entering the sensor pattern is the fraction of the area covered,
or
Pr( target enters footprint) = Pr(L satisfies -Rmax <x< Rmax) (eqn 4.S)
If the sensor is not a definite range law device, then the sensor may fail to detect the
target even if it enters the sensor pattern. The detection probability is obtained by
accounting for all possible lateral ranges in the coverage pattern, PDET(T) = (fraction
of the area covered) x (PDET | the target is covered),
PDET(T) = (2 x Rmax x L A>x j i-Rmav Rmax)PBAR F(x)dx (eqn 4.9)
F(x) is the probability density that the lateral range has value, x, given that it is located
somewhere in the range |-R,^ nv . R^^}. Of note is that F(x) is uniformlv distributed
1 1 Id.A 1 1 Id. A
on {-R,„.1V . R rri ., v i because the target is located randomlv. Thus.v max max ^
PDET(T) = Pr( detection in time. T)
= S x J.
Note: this is consistent with the definition of W for the definite range law
e. The sweep width must alwavs satisfv W
applies in the case of the definite ranee law sensor.

















Figure 4.14 Typical Lateral Range Curves.
When a non-overlapping search (see Figure 4.15) is conducted with the
arbitrary sensing device, the largest path that can be searched before overlap occurs is
'max
A (2 x R ). Thus,max'
PDFTiT ) = W / (2 x Rmax' K max (eqn 4.U>>
The value of PDET(Tmax) is less than 1.0 ifW < 2 x Rmav
The TAR model consists of two functions, collection management and
information acquisition. The next sections will describe the attributes required of the









Figure 4.15 PDET for Non-overlapping Search with W < 2 x Rmax .
B. REQUEST FOR RECONNAISSANCE
Since the role of reconnaissance operations is to keep the perception database as
current as possible, a request (see Figure 4.16) can be viewed as a query (15) directed
at the perceived database. Each query is based on the time of the last database update
(16). The information pertains to nodes and arcs contained within a region designated
by sector coordinates of the mission order. A request (IS) for TAR is initiated when
this information is not in the database (1") or if the information is too old.' Two
classes of requests may be generated, preplanned (routine) or immediate.
1. Preplanned Requests
Preplanned requests are initiated for information requirements that are
foreseen. Once the initial data is input into the model and the corps area of interest is
determined, a preplanned mission list is formulated to provide surveillance of each
command level's area of interest. This consists o[ dividing regions (containing enemy
expected avenues of approach) into smaller sections called sectors, comparing the
coordinates of these areas with the coordinates received from the corps level mission
'Refers to the passage of simulated time relative to the last perceived database
update. The required timeliness of perceptions is a research issue vet to be addressed.
For example, what is the relative difference in utility of information obtained 15
minutes earlier? ...45 minutes earlier? Additionally, how' does this need for information
bv time, t. impact the simulation clock process 'time that expires when the planning



























Figure 4. 16 Determining When to Initiate a Request.
orders, and requesting the corresponding collection missions. The responsibility for
this class of request rests with each IEP. As stated earlier, requests How through the
intelligence module with the IEP performing an inferencing function. Because the I LP
predicts enemy mobility corridors, it seems plausible that the IEP act to substantiate its
predictions by generating a prioritized list of preplanned (routine) reconnaissance
missions. Prioritization in this context refers to the timing window in which the
information is required.
2. Immediate Requests
Immediate requests are generated to meet specific information requirements
which cannot be satisfied by the preplanned missions. These requests stem from the
case where a command level becomes aware that a significant deviation from the macro
plan has occurred. Micro planning would result in an attempt to restore the simulated
battlefield situation to one that would permit the accomplishment of the existing macro
plan. [Ref. 3: p. 35] Invocation of the planning mode may require an immediate
update to the perceived database in the form of a timely mission that is capable of
providing a point update of a designated node.
C. REQUEST COMPONENTS
Requests enter the TAR model and are immediately time tagged. This provides a
base time to determine how long requests remain in the system. Because requests
determine when to look, what to look for, and where to look, the proposed
components of all requests are as follows:
Time entered system: simulation clock process time in which a request was
received from the IE P.
Request number: sequential numbering scheme.
Area of interest: node numbers corresponding to the locations of the nodes and
arcs of interest.
Range to target area: sum of the distances of arcs along the shortest path to the
target area.
Coverage type: the sensor type(s) to be used on a collection platform.
Timing window: the period of time preceding a decision period in which the
information is required.
The request number is merely a sequential numbering of requests that enter the
request queue. The area of interest refers to the sector of the battlefield upon which
information is required. As alluded to earlier, each sector is composed of nodes, arcs
and target attributes. Nodes correspond to ground positions that are connected by
routes or arcs and may represent a bridge, city, or just a certain segment of the terrain.
Nodes may contain force units which are composed of entities. Entities are defined as
the individual combat vehicles, facilities, or weapon systems. Each simulated combat
entity possesses several attributes. Attributes, also referred to as state variables,
describe the state of each entity.
The air space from which targets are to be detected can be viewed as a series of
three dimensional projections from nodes ot~ the terrain network. Each node is
numbered, thus range is defined as the minimum distance to a given node contained in
the area of interest to the requesting unit's location. Range would actually be
expressed in terms of coordinates. Coverage type refers to the sensor system on a
platform used to acquire the requested information. The sensor system selected is a
function of several parameters, type of target, amount of coverage area desired, and the
perceived threat environment.
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The timing window actually consists of two times: a not earlier than (NET) time
and a not later than (NLT) time. These times refer to the earliest and latest possible
simulated clock process times that the information is required by the planning model in
order to be useful in the current formulation of macro plans. To illustrate the use of
these times refer back to the decision' period. The decision period was defined as the
maximum period of time allotted to a particular command level decision task to
accomplish an assigned mission. The mission has an associated start time, t and an
end time, t . Additionally, through updates to the perceived database, several times in
which forces are to engage enemy force entities, t
,
are determined. Given t and
the current simulation clock process time, t , some time t is determined to be the
first clock time an update is required. More specifically, it determines when the timing
of the current perceived information exceeds some predetermined threshold such that
an information update is required. This clock time is the NT: I'. The NLT refers to the
clock time when a final update to the perceived database is required before the decision
period begins. The length of time between the NET and the NLT is called the timing
window. A procedure to calculate these information requirement times is a research
issue yet to be addressed.
1. Collection Management
Receipt of a request for information initiates the collection management
portion of the TAR model. The collection management function is responsible for
front end processing of all requests and determination oi~ request validity. The
collection management function exists because there is a limited quantity of collector
resources and serves as the central repository for all requests. Nomination of the areas
that should be covered by each individual search process is determined as well as the
nature of each search in order to minimize search errors. The end product of the
collection management function is a scheduled reconnaissance events collection plan.
'I he plan is based on collection assets available, their capabilities, time oi' required
sensor coverage, and the stated information requirements. The collection management
function is subdivided into two parts; request validation and collection plan generation.
1
"I he main simulation event list consists of a sequence of times, of which each
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a. Request laliitation
Validating a request is a confirmation procedure that ensures each request's
continuation through the TAR model, Figure 4.17. This consists of evaluating the
three possible conditions that could cause a request to be cancelled. The three general
conditions are: the area to be reconnoitered is no longer of interest, information on an
area of interest is to be updated by other means, or the expected collection platform
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Figure 4.17 Collection Management Request Validation.
The first step in the validation procedure is to determine if the sector of the
battlefield designated in the collection request is still of interest (19). For example,
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suppose the coordinates of the sector of interest. A, have changed due to an
infeasibility associated with the macro plan. A new area. A', may become the sector oi'
interest, thus preempting the original request for information in sector A. It may not
be feasible to continue the request to reconnoiter sector A. Each request has resource
implications, therefore collection assets must be employed selectively.
The perceived database is envisioned to receive updates from three sources
(20). These sources, as shown in Figure 4. IS. are ground organic. TAR. and national











Figure 4.18 Collection Inputs to the Perceived Database.
assumed to be handled simply as periodic updates to the perceived database.
Ground organic collection assets will provide periodically updated
information obtained in areas approximately five to 25 kilometers from the FLOT in
each respective area of influence while national collection assets provide periodic
extended range coverage. The national assets provide coverage from collection
platforms such as satellites or possibly extremely high altitude platforms. Periodic
information provided by these high altitude collection platforms provide the database
details through imaging techniques or simulated signals intelligence (SIGINT).
Imager}' is a process of providing photographic-type details ol' objects or areas, thus
updates received through this means may provide information regarding the terrain
network or enemy force composition. SIGINT is a process of intercepting
electromagnetic emissions and the associated perceived information may possibly
provide updates on the enemy's operating location or characteristics of his weapons
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and equipment. Although the types ofinformation obtained by high altitude collection
assets can be extremely valuable in the development of macro plans, it may have
limited utility. Meteorological conditions may hamper the performance of imaging
systems thereby affecting the timeliness of updates to the perceived database.
Redundant coverage (i.e. by national and TAR collection assets) may be required to
attain a minimum acceptable probability of a successful collection mission.
If the requested area to be reconnoitered is adequately9 covered by periodic
collection efforts then, from an optimization perspective, the request for TAR should
be cancelled. Other checks that must be performed are:
• Is the sector partially or completely overlapped bv other designated collection
areas?
• Is the timine of the information updates feasible in order to support macro plan
development?
Once requests are validated, they are given a priority (see Figure 4.19) in
order to develop a scheduled reconnaissance collection plan. The key element used to
develop these plans is the timing window. Since this window refers to the minimum
and maximum acceptable times in which collection missions must be performed, the
prioritization is determined by ordering requests based primarily on the NLT.
b. Request Prioritization
Prioritization begins with determining mission package contents (21). The
mission package refers to the mix of collection platforms, sensors, and support systems
that provide the responsiveness necessary to accomplish a collection mission. This is
an iterative process where expected platform losses (23) due to currently known ground
and air threats along routes determined in (22) are calculated. The formulation of
feasible routes to and from the target area must be generated by projecting flight paths
(22) for the reconnaissance missions. This procedure uses information from the
perceived database on node locations of the last known enemy air defense sites and
enemy weapon capabilities to generate a network of flight paths. These flight paths
represent routes to and from the FLOT. to and from the target area, and from within
the target area. Flight paths can be viewed as elevated ground nodes with connecting
arcs. The flight path generation procedure is designed to generate the elevated routes
by minimizing exposure times to the current perceived enemy air defense threats while
being constrained by the information request NLT requirements.
The term 'adequately', in this context, refers to whether or not the specific
information requirements contained in the request are satisfied. These requirements
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Figure 4.19 Collection Management Request Prioritization.
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The process of determining threats to collection platforms may be handled
initially in the development of ALARM as a front end data input to the model. Tables
consisting of enemy force threat codes and the corresponding mission packages can be
formulated a priori. The threat code refers to the perceived threat along a selected
(light path, while the mission package may include several escort fighter type platforms.
An additional constraint placed on the procedure to develop a mission
package is to compose the package with the minimum number of resources. This
procedure may take several iterations to complete due to the probability of a successful
mission, forecasted in (23). not reaching an acceptable level, given the perceived threat
environment and the information timing requirements stated in the request for TAR.
If a feasible mission package cannot be determined, or if losses are perceived to be
higher than acceptable to satisfy the request, then the request is forwarded to the
national collection function. All requests with feasible expected loss and mission
package contents are then checked to ensure the request is still valid and can meet the
timing window (24).
c. Sensor Functions and Attributes
The types of sensor functions envisioned for representation in the TAR model are
imagery and surveillance radar. A description of each function along with a list of
attributes follows.
(1) Imagery. Imagery derived reconnaissance is a key element in
supporting information needs for the development of macro plans. Imagery is defined
as sensors capable of providing "photographic" type information of entities on the
terrain network. Sensor types capable of providing these battlefield pictures are
optical, infra-red (IR), and radar.
An optical sensing function or aerial photography was used as far back
in American history as the Civil War. During that time artists drew sketches of the
battlefield while elevated in captive balloons [Ref. 10: p. 157]. In fact, studies have
shown that during World War II approximately 80% of all useful military intelligence
came from aerial reconnaissance photographs [Ref. 10: p. 125]. The basic principle of
the optical capabilities is that targets reflect a signature in the visible light spectrum
that is measured as a visual contrast with the environment. This is conducted along a
straight path between the target area and collection platform called the line of sight
(LOS). A rough estimate of the distance a man can see. assuming the fictitious fellow-
is in the middle a calm ocean and ignoring meteorological distortion, is d = v (1.5)h.
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where d is the distance in miles and h is the height above sea level in feet. Thus, a six
foot man can see approximately three miles. Elevate him to a height of 66 feet and his
horizon stretches to 10 miles. From a radar equipped platform orbiting at 35.000 ft.,
the horizon is no less than 230 miles. The minimum practical height for a
reconnaissance satellite is about 100 miles and they can theoretically "see" about 890
miles! [Ref. 11: p. 7] Despite other significant and sophisticated monitoring devices,
the photograph is perhaps the most important piece of information a unit command
level's intelligence module can receive to initiate or verify plans.
Photographic reconnaissance cameras take a succession of individual
glimpses with shutter speeds varying between 1 1000 and 1 3000 seconds. The speed
at which each glimpse is executed varies according to the particular platform's image
motion compensation (IMC) needs. IMC calculations are derived from inputs about
the platform's altitude and speed. It causes adjustments to be made so that blurry
frames are minimized due to the frame rate not being equivalent to the rate at which
images traverse the lens aperture. The lens aperture is adjusted automatically to the
ambient light, film type, and other variables. For night reconnaissance operations, the
camera is assumed to take a sequence of glimpses when photoflash cartridges, ejected
from the platform, illuminate the immediate area.
The two basic slant angles in which imagery is obtained are vertical
and oblique. Vertical slants furnish coverage of the search area from directly above a
target while oblique slants provide a view of an area from an angle not directly over
the target. Towards the edges coverage is poor, partly due to the distance from the
platform to the target and partly because of an almost horizontal grazing angle.
Vertical zones are seen to provide the most information without loss around edges.
Infra-red (IR) imagery permits the detection of thermal energy.
Fundamentally, any entity or source that radiates heat can be an IR emitter. Each
emitter possesses a particular pattern of emission called an IR signature. The signature
emanating from the source is normally different from the temperature of the
background environment. Thus a thermal contrast results, permitting detection of the
entity. These sensors yield a picture-like rendition of the target entity and background
which also provides the means for detecting camouflaged objects. Enemy entities
possessing attributes of buildings, airfields, or artillery batteries that are camouflaged,
for example, can be detected in simulated day or night activities.
Glimpse is a search process explained by Smith, see [Ref. 8].
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IR sensors provide either a point or area detection capability. This
refers to the field of view provided by the sensor. Point detection implies a narrow
field of view, possibly concentrated on a single node. Area detection is essentially
several point detectors connected in parallel and capable of covering a wider area. The
main difference in these capabilities is that it takes less time to process a narrow field
of view than to process an area. In the model, this may be a prime consideration if
near real-time updates to the perceived database are required.
The final type of imagery is radar imagery which is still concentrated at
detecting ground targets. The typical radar is a side looking radar that can sweep
across the ground network out of either side of the collection platform. These sensors
provide information on moving targets as well as imagery by detecting shifts in the
frequency of energy reflected off of ground entities.
(2) Surveillance Radar. A surveillance radar capability is necessary to
provide information on enemy air activity to the perceived database. The basic
principle of radar is range measurement by timing echoes, produced by electromagnetic
energy, bounced off of a target. The burst of energy travels at the speed of light which
is 3 x 10 meters per second. Lsing the distance formula, the length of time required
for the energy burst to be reflected from a target one nautical mile away is 12.35
microseconds. This is defined as a radar mile. Therefore, energy transmitted at time,
tQ, and received 1235 microseconds later means that the distance to the target is 100
nautical miles and located somewhere within the the radiation pattern of the
transmitting antenna. Azimuth, defined as the angle of horizontal deviation measured
clockwise from north, is determined by narrowing the width of the transmitted beam.
The beam is then rotated until the direction of maximum return energy is found. This
point in which maximum energy is received is the direction of the echo. If the
beamwidth of the transmitting antenna were 1 degree, then the target azimuth would
be known to within a maximum error oi' 1 degree. Now, if the transmitting antenna
were rotated through a full 360 degrees, the transmitter energy turned on and off at
timed intervals, and all echos received were correlated with the azimuths at the time
each echo was received, then scanning would result. Scan duration is the time required
for one complete rotation of the antenna.
(3) Collector Attributes. Each simulated collector has several attributes to
describe its unique situation. The following attributes are basic to each sensor-
platform combination. First, maximum effective range into enemy defenses is normally
55
an attribute that is associated with the platform and should he distinguished from
detection range which is a sensor characteristic. This variable is heavily influenced by
factors such as prevailing weather or condition of the platform. The second attribute is
a sensor descriptor which stipulates the necessary conditions to detect a target by a
sensor type. This attribute is a function of the range, time of observation, and the
intensiveness of the reconnaissance collection mission. The third basic attribute is
primarily a sensor characteristic which centers on the accuracy provided in target
determination. The magnitude of the errors for a given device is a function of the
distance to the target, environmental conditions, and the time of intelligence processing
performed by the CIP. Next and quite important is the aspect of time. Of particular
interest is the segment of simulation clock process time that elapses from the moment
of target detection to the moment the collected data reaches the appropriate
intelligence node. Depending on the collection means, this time may be very short or
of substantial duration. An additional component is the time lag which is the
simulation clock process time from the moment TAR missions are assigned to the
moment of target detection. Other attributes that accompany each collection platform
are included in Appendix A.
2. The Scheduled Reconnaissance Mission Timing Plan
Following request validation, each request is entered into a mission timing
plan. The purpose of these collection plans is to alert the execution model that a
collection event is to occur. Each collection plan covers a 24 hour simulation clock
process period of time. Creation of a plan simplifies the insertion of missions
generated by immediate requests for reconnaissance. Within the 24 hour time period
only a finite number of missions can be carried out because activities such as
maintenance must be accounted for and an infinite supply of platforms does not exist.
All scheduled missions are placed into time slots that are subsets of the time horizon
covered by the reconnaissance event list. The next batch of reconnaissance missions
would be listed in the next scheduled events list depending on the timing requirements
of the requested information.
3. Information Acquisition
Information acquisition is the procedure, carried out within the execution
model, to actually collect information and update the perception database (see figure
4.2<)). The procedure begins with the launch (25) of a mission package whose contents
has been determined by the collection management function. Once within proximity to













Figure 4.20 Information Acquisition Flow.
The three target categories of which information is to be collected against are
fixed, mobile, and moving. Fixed targets are those entities that are not readily
movable. For example, hardened C facilities are fixed targets. The second type of
target is the mobile target. These targets exist at a particular location for a limited
amount of time. The final category of target consists of moving targets. These targets
are highly mobile and may be difficult to locate. The fundamental target acquisition
process used to acquire these targets is as follows. [Ref. 9] A differential target
signature is transmitted through the atmosphere to the location of the platform. If
geometric line of sight (LOS) does not exist, then transmission is blocked, possibly by
the terrain, and acquisition will not occur. Even if LOS exists, the target signature
may be attenuated by the prevailing atmospheric conditions before it reaches the
platform. The target must next enter the sensor's field of view. In the field of view,
the attenuated target signature is then processed to form an image of the target scene.
Computations are made to account for optical losses in the case where photographic
lenses are being utilized on the platform. Following an appropriate time delay to
account for the transition of the platform to a collection node, the intelligence is
processed and the perception database is updated (27 & 28). The information is then
used to update SIP predictions.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter provides some required decision logic and describes a procedure for
requesting tactical airborne reconnaissance to supply updates to the perceived
database. In the procedure, all requests are validated and prioritized before entering
the scheduled reconnaissance collection plan. This plan is essentially an abstraction for
the actual tasking of collection platforms.
The objective of collection platforms is to satisfy information requirements
established by the IEP and validated by the collection management function. This
objective is accomplished through the utilization of a mix of sensors that are capable of
detecting varying forms of enemy activity. The type of sensor selected is a function of
any combination of the following factors:
Enemy threat.
Range to target and platform range.
Target characteristics and the characteristics of the collector.
The terrain and its influence on the collector.
Timing window and response time of the collector.
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• Weather conditions and weather limitations of the collector.
In addition, this chapter includes attributes of the collection platforms and provides an
overview of a search process that will occur within the execution model. The search is
conducted to determine if entities are to be detected as collection platforms supply the
reconnaissance function within mobility corridors. If detection occurs, the information
will be passed to the planning model after an appropriate time delay to represent the
processing of the information. The information is then used to update the perceived
database and determine if the current macro plan is to be modified.
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V. PERCEPTION GENERATION EXAMPLE
A. SCENARIO
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the application of TAR to update
the perceived database by extending an example developed by Fletcher [Ref. 5: pp. 51 -
60]. To proceed, a blue armor brigade has received an order from a higher echelon to
defend in its assigned sector against the attack of a red motorized rifle division. The
mission objective of the blue force is to prevent the red forces from advancing past the
blue brigade's rear boundary area. A troop list representing the assets available to the
brigade is received as part of the order input from the higher blue division. For this
example, blue force units and characteristics are listed in Table 2. Intelligence received
from the IEP along with the mission order is provided in Table 3.
TABLE 2
BLUE BRIGADE COMPOSITION
*/ UNITTYPE BlP i D IS Ti S TA TE[
x
l
Tank Bn. 1000 20 km LOO
x
2
Tank Bn. 1000 20 km 1.00
x
3
Tank Bn. 1000 20 km LOO




-> UNIT TYPE: the type of unit of which %.- is a member.
1
J. DIST:: the distance X: is from the location in which the mission is to
be conducted.
4. STATE:: the current condition of" the unit which includes the
percentage of ammunition, equipment, and personnel that x. currently
possesses".
5. The decision period is from tw to t-,_j.
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TABLE 3








>'4 Tank Rg. 3600 39 km 1.00
The macro plan stipulates an initial allocation of units to defend at the FEBA
based on the predicted avenues of approach input provided by the IEP. Additionally,
the corresponding rates at which all entities of each force advance and expend supplies
is assumed known. The initial macro plan calls for the commitment of tank battalions
Xi and x-> at the time of engagement, tj^, while all other blue force units remain
uncommitted. In order to fully convey the initial set tip a visual presentation of red
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Figure 5.1 Initial Perceived Situation at time t
for the commitment of Xj and x-» at ti^.
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B. TIME. T
Before stepping through the methodology described in chapter IV to determine
macro plan feasibility, consider the situation on the timeline at time, t,, (refer to
Appendix B for the complete timeline of events). At t
()
an update to the perceived
database has occured. The search process has resulted in the identification y-» in
brigade sector =2 and y_j in brigade sector £3. The intelligence module accepts this
input and formulates the associated initial red and blue SIP curves (see Figure 5.2).
Additionally, the brigade's IEP submits requests for TAR missions in the brigade's area
of interest to seek out red follow-on forces.
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Fieure 5.2 Power Curves Resulting from an Information
I pdate at t^.~
6 2
TAR missions, shown in Table 4, are added to the scheduled reconnaissance
events list to occur at times. U, tr, and tjj with specified mission 1 'packages and
information deadlines. Sequentially following the timeline, an initial mission feasibility
check is performed by determining the difference in current perceived power levels
between forces in the brigade's sector. The feasibility check does not reflect a SIP
threshold violation and therefore indicates that the current plan, formulated at ti, to
actually commit Xi and x-> against y*» and y^ at time, tj^, which is the projected time
of engagement, is feasible.
TABLE 4
SCHEDULED RECONNAISSANCE EVENTS LIST








l n Z f 12
f
13 Y *14
The logic involved in this "need for a decision" process is provided in Figures 5.3
and 5.4. The initial mission order input is received at (1). At this time the intelligence
module is activated and must determine information requirements which is essentially a
query of the perceived database (2). Information needs and gaps are identified, at such
time the IEP (3a) forwards a request for additional information. An example oi' the
composition of a request is as follows;
Mission packages refer to the total sum of all collection platforms, sensors, and
support svstems that provide the responsiveness necessarv to accomplish a collection
mission. For this simple example let:
a. X : a package best suited for sector search scanning.
b. Y : a package that is sufficient for both sector search and point search, and











a when lo look
b. where to look
c. what to look with
Ik FORMULATE COMMITTMENT
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Figure 5.4 Process Flow Continued.
• Time entered system : tj (i.e.. this is a time tag to identify exactly when a
request is forwarded)
• Request number : 24 {i.e., the 24 request in the collection management
system)
• Area of interest : sectors -1 and =2 (refer to Figure 5.1, grid coordinates and
node numbers will actually be used to identify targeted areas)
• Range to target : 55km (range to the estimated target location along a
sequence of arcs)
• Coverage type : X (i.e., surveillance mode or area scan)
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• Timing window : NET t- and NLT te (i.e.. due to the current perception state.
information is required not earlier than time, N, and not later than time. t*, in
order for the brigade command level decision task to make combat decisions)
The intelligence module prepares SIP curves (3b) based on the information
received during the query performed in (2). Feasibility of the resulting plan is checked
and if feasible, the commitment events outlined in the plan are added to a master
events list. At (4) the TAR model is invoked. The request generated in (3a) is
validated and prioritized based on timing requirements of all existing missions waiting
to be executed.
The procedure results in a scheduled reconnaissance event plan that is forwarded
to the execution model (5). While the execution model is running, information
gathering activities generated at all levels result in an update to the perceived database
(6). This update may or may not be in the form of newly acquired battlefield
information due to the possible attrition of some collection platforms from simulated
enemy anti-air activity. If no battlefield information is received then the execution
model will continue to process events from the master events list (7). Finally, if new
information is received at (S). the simulation clock is advanced to account for the time
required to process the information. A flag from the perceived database causes the
execution model to pause and existing plans are then checked to determine if new plans
must be formulated.
C. TIME, T3
At time, t->. the next TAR mission is executed from the scheduled reconnaissance
events list resulting in new information being received at t^. A visual presentation is
provided in Figure 5.5. During execution the information was actually collected at t_j
but the simulation clock process time must be advanced to account for the platform's
transition back to a collection node and to physically process the collected information.
The information consists of detection of a red airfield in sector -3 which immediately
causes the planning model to be called.
The planning model is invoked resulting in the formulation of a new SIP curse.
Assume that the blue force does not possess operational control of any assets capable
of reaching and prosecuting the red airfield. Although the airfield is obviously an
Note: the execution model continues to run while new plans are being
formulated. At some time later these new plans may result in new orders to tiie
execution model.
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Figure 5.5 Perceived Situation at time t^.
extremely high value target, the existing macro plan developed at tj would remain in
force as the current macro plan. The existing events list would remain unchanged
while the commitment of assets is not redirected to prosecute this lucrative target.
D. TIME. T
12
At time. tp. the planning model is again invoked resulting in the formulation of
new SIP curves based on the newly acquired information (this information is a result of
the tg mission in which y, and y-> are detected and identified). These new SIP curves
indicate that the plan which committed tank battalions x. and x-> initially at the FEBA
aeainst red first echelon reeiments. v-> and v,, and with uncommitted units x-». Xi. and
x^ becomes infeasible 4.3 hours after the beginning of the decision period. The
resulting point of infeasibility, shown in Figure 5.6, is a violation of the upper
threshold value. The projected violation time corresponds to the estimated time of
arrival of the most recently detected red second echelon units Vj and y-, (see Figure
5.7).
Courses of action are now developed to restore feasibility by first determining
notification times for each entity through functional submodels. Notification times are
used to generate all possible asset(i) to target(j) paired combinations. Fourteen
resulting courses of action are generated of which six are feasible (see Table 5). The
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Figure 5.6 Power Curves Resulting from
the Information Update at to7
feasible course of action which generates the maximum ratio of red power destroyed to
blue power used is selected. The course of action selected is for artillery unit x_j to
prosecute y-. with a time of engagement of 1.5 hours after the start of the decision
period. The SIP curve resulting from this decision is shown in Figure 5.8.
Stepping back through the plan to check for feasibility, another violation is
detected. It is projected to occur at 4.5 hours after the start of the decision period.
Again feasible courses of action must be determined. It is noted here that the artillery
unit is again considered for use in the development of courses of action. This
represents that process in the real world of redirecting fires against an enemy target
beyond the FEBA in order to attrit that unit prior to its arrival at the FEBA [Ref. 5: p.
58]. Two courses of action were developed during this iterative process of checking
macro plan feasibility. Implementation of the perceived optimal course of action
results in the SIP shown in Figure 5.9. Stepping back through the plan now does not
produce any violations, therefore until such time when new information is received
through collection efforts, the plan is feasible and is the current macro plan. The
commitment events of the plan are listed in Table 6.
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Figure 5.8 Second Iteration Power Curve resulting from
the Information Update at time to.
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TABLE 5
FEASIBLE COURSES OF ACTION GENERATED AT TIME. Tp
Feasible course of action t£na xi yj
Power Ralio
1 1.5 hrs. x4 >'3 51.4
2 1.5 hrs. x4 >4 28.5
3 0.5 hrs. x
3
57.4
4 0.5 hrs. x
3 >4 28.5
5 1.0 hrs. x
3 >4 57.4




• t is the time of engagement.
• x. is a blue force entity.
• \'j is a red force entity.
• Power ratio is the proportion of red power ne utral zed to blue
Power expended.




Fieure 5.9 Third Iteration Power Curve resulting from
the Information Update at time to.
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E. TIME, T 13
At time, tig, a reconnaissance mission was executed, however no additional
information was obtained. The macro plan generated after the perception database
update at tp remains as the current plan of operations. This plan may only be
modified during the course of the decision period. This may occur when the brigade
level decision task, determines that achievement of the plan is not possible. The
planning mode would be invoked using current perceptions to project red power and
allocate the associated blue force resource requirements.
TABLE 6
MACRO PLAN FOR EVENTS TO BEGIN AT TIME, T 16
Time Event
1.5 hours x i fires on y->
2.0 hours commit Xj to defend at the FEBA against y-»
2.0 hours commit x-» to defend at the FEBA against y*
2.5 hours Xj fires on y->
4.0 hours commit x-> to defend at the FEBA against y.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has demonstrated the development of a macro plan by stepping
through the perception generation procedure. These macro plans are formulated in
ALARM using an iterative process of
1. determining initial mission feasibility,
2. developing initial feasible courses of action, and
3. selecting a course of action which restores feasibility for the duration of the
decision period.
The final macro plan provides an output for the allocation and commitment of
unit entities over time. This list of commitment events provides a detailed audit trail of





The purpose of this thesis was to explore some initial issues that must be
addressed in order to imbed a credible model of reconnaissance operations within the
Airland Research Model (ALARM). During the course of the research effort the
objectives of identifying and describing attributes of reconnaissance operations, which
in turn, provide updates to the perceived database were achieved. The document
provides a description of the current conceptual design of the Airland Research Model
and details the planning methodology utilized within the model. Background on the
operational environment in which the model will operate, the connection between this
work on reconnaissance operations, the perception generation process, and ALARM s
planning scheme was provided. In addition, the following areas were addressed:
• A description of the reconnaissance cycle which is the perception formulation
process used to update the perceived database.
• The structure of the Tactical Air Reconnaissance (TAR) model which is
subdivided into a collection management and an information acquisition sub-
models.
• A description of the evolution and development o^ the perception database bv
walking through a sample scenario.
B. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are several areas in the development of algorithms to support the
integration of an airborne collection function that require additional research. These
areas must be addressed before reaching the phase to begin coding the TAR model.
First, the interface between the intelligence module and TAR requests must be further
refined. It was stated that the intelligence estimate processor (IEP) will perform an
inferencing function to determine where to vector the collection platforms. Current
U.S. Army doctrine states that decision templates will be used to predict these enemy
courses of action. A methodology for abstracting this intelligence procedure is
required.
Second, a means for modelling the act of communicating all acquired information
back to specific intelligence collection nodes must be developed. The procedure should
address the differences between information, that which is used to formulate
perceptions, and data, that which is the abstract "information form' transmitted along
72
the modelled communications medium. Note that information content is not
necessarily equivalent to the amount of data transmitted. Use of a communications
network may satisfy this requirement with nodes representing information sources and
sinks while arcs represent the various transmission rates, measured in bits per unit
time.
The third area requiring work is the implementation of an initial network system
to model the flight paths of the collection platforms. Research in this area should
focus on a procedure to assign alternative ingress and egress routes from a dynamically
generated air-transportation network. An additional dimension required in this area is
to develop the measures of effectiveness associated by possibly contrasting various
network [light profiles.
The detection model to be used in ALARM is yet to be precisely defined. An
issue that must be evaluated before the necessary detection algorithms can be
developed is the determination of an appropriate method of target aggregation within
mobility corridors. This issue concerns the derivation of probabilities, per
reconnaissance mission, of detecting a particular type of target entity as a function of
the entity's location on the terrain network. In addition, this area requires clarification
on how to determine the fraction of total target entities, in a given search path.
detected during the execution of a given collection mission.
The final area identified requiring additional research goes beyond the utilization
of collection platforms in the model. This area applies to the "other"' airborne-type
platform functions to be called Upon by the air asset decision task. These platforms
will perform the air tasks required in ALARM such as close air support or battlefield
air interdiction. The generalized value system or some other means must be applied to
these airborne combat functions in order to assess the tradeoffs and the utility
associated with formulating macro plans that specify either the allocation of these air




1. ATTRIBUTES THAT ACCOMPANY EACH COLLECTION PLATFORM
a. AIR WARNING(X) = location of known enemv platforms that are in the
vicinity of active collection platform X.
b. COMMUNICATE(X) = the method of transmitting the imaging information
back to a command node. This determines whether or not a real-time
communications link is in place to control the advance rate of the simulation
clock.
c. EGRESS ROUTE(X) = the node numbers corresponding to the air route to
be down from the collection site.
d. ENEMY(X) = list of enemv entities which have been detected by platform X
along with location, size, and rate of advance at the time of detection.
e. FILM(X) = the amount of unexposed film capacity remaining on platforms
equipped with photographic imaging sensors.
f. FUEL(X) = the amount of fuel currently on platform X.
g. GROUND_WARNING(X) = location of known enemv entities on the terrain
network that can potentially affect the collection mission of collector X. This
attribute can be utilized in the procedure to determine routes minimizing
exposure times.
h. INGRESS ROUTE(X) = the node numbers corresponding to the air route to
be traversed to the designated collection area.
i. TARGET LOCATION^ X) = the detected target locations bv ground network
node number.
j. PLATFORM_POSITIO\(X), = the three dimensional (x.v.z) battlefield
position of the collection platform.
k. REQUEST(X) = node numbers contained in the request over which the
platform is to collect information.
1. SE\SOR_ON(X) = the target acquisition system employed on platform X.
m. STATUSPLATFORM(X) = the current status of a collection platform (i.e.
dead, unavailable, on mission).
n. STATUS SENSOR(X) = the status o( an imaging sensor system (i.e. dead,
unavailable, on mission).
o. TIME_ON_TARGET(X) = the collection search type to be performed (point
or area search).
p. TYPE(X) = the type of platform used (each tvpe has different range and speed
limitations).
2. OTHER RADIOMETRIC AND RADAR VARIABLES TO CONSIDER WHEN
MODELLING SENSOR-TARGET ACQUISITION
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3a. Radiometric variables required to model the imaging process
Absorptance - the fraction of power per unit area incident upon an entity's
surface that is absorbed by a sample placed in the path of incident light.
Absorptivity - the absorptance per unit pathlength through a medium.
3. Emissance - the fraction of radiant emittance of an entity's surface relative to
the emittance from an ideal surface.
4. Irradiance - the power per unit area incident upon a perceived surface.
5. Power - energy per unit time.
6. Radiance - radiant power per unit solid angle per unit area of source projected
normal to the solid angle.
7. Radiant ernittance - the power per unit area radiated from an entity's surface.
8. Radiant intensity - radiant power per unit solid angle from a point source
(platform).
9. Reflectance - the fraction of irradiance that is reflected from an ideal surface.
10. Transmittance - the fraction of irradiance that is transmitted through a sample
placed in the path of incident light.
b. Basic radar variables required to model radar acquisition
1. Azimuth definition - the degree of accuracy to which the radar can measure
azimuth.
2. Azimuth resolution - the ability of the radar to separate two targets close in
azimuth at approximately the same range.
3. Beamwidth - the narrowness of the antenna beam.
4. Pulse duration - the time that the radar is transmitting RF energy
5. Pulse repetition time - the time required for a complete transmission cycle.
6. Pulse repetition frequency - the number of pulses per second that the radar
transmits.
7. Recovery time - the time immediately following transmission time, during which
the receiver is unable to process target returns."
8. Rest time - the time between the end of one transmitted pulse and the
beginning of the next.
9. Listening time - the time the receiver can process target echoes.
10. Dutv cvcle - the ratio of the time the transmitter operates to the time it could
operate' in a given transmission cycle.
11. Peak power - maximum power output during transmission time.
12. Average power - peak power distributed over the pulse repetition time.
13. Range definition - the degree of accuracy to which the radar can measure range.
14. Range resolution - the ability of the radar to separate two targets close in range
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